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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
GRANT HILDRETH, 
Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20080615-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED IN A 
CHALLENGE TO A DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR SEVERANCE; 
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, HILDRETH ADEQUATELY 
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
The State argues that, because a determination of severance and/or admission of 
evidence under UT. R. EVID. 404(b) is fact intensive, that UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) requires 
a marshaling of the evidence in such challenges. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 23-30. The 
State argues that Hildreth failed to properly marshal the evidence and that it is grounds 
for summary rejection of his appeal. Id. at p. 26. Unfortunately, the State has failed to 
adequately support this argument with proper authority and/or analysis. 
Although a determination of severance under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l and/or 
admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) are fact-intensive, their ultimate determinations 
l 
rest on conclusions of law rendered by the trial court under those specific provisions. 
The State fails to specifically quote UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9), which indicates that, "...a 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." (Emphasis added). It does not indicate a marshaling requirement 
for challenges to conclusions of law rendered by a trial court. Our appellate courts have 
particularly addressed this issue and determined that a challenge to the legal sufficiency 
of the findings themselves does not require a marshaling of the evidence. Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, | 8 fn. 3, 203 P.3d 1020. This position is further clarified in 
Kimball v. Kimball as follows: 
In light of the confusion evidence in this case regarding when and how a 
party must engage in a marshaling analysis, and given the oft-expressed 
frustration of the bar with the marshaling requirement, we take this 
opportunity to clarify what marshaling really is. In its classic application, 
marshaling the evidence serves a very important function. It adds 
discipline and order to challenges to factual findings, precluding an 
unfocused allegation that the findings lack evidentiary support and 
requiring the appellate court to comb the record and see if that might 
possibly be true. Instead, the marshaling doctrine, now recognized in our 
rules, see, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)("A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding."), requires that counsel identify which particular findings are 
challenged as lacking adequate evidentiary support and then show the court 
why that is so. This can only logically be done by summarizing, or 
"marshaling," whatever evidence there is that supports each challenged 
finding. We emphasize that only the supporting evidence is legally relevant 
and is all that counsel should call our attention to. See, Neeley v. Bennett, 
2002 UT App 189, If 12, 51 P.3d 724 ("[A]n exhaustive or voluminous 
recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if this recitation includes 
within its body the facts that support the challenged ruling, is not what is 
expected."), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
Ibid, 2009 UT App 233, 120 at fn. 5, 217 P.3d 733 (emphasis added in bold). The 
State's recitation of the marshaling requirement is not only unfounded in its application 
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of Rule 24(a)(9) to challenges to the trial court's conclusions of law rendered under either 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l or Rule 404(b), but its case law upon which it relies has been 
revisited and clarified in Kimball, supra, as applicable only to "challenges to factual 
findings." The State's position is thus flawed. 
Hildreth challenged the legal sufficiency of the findings, or the conclusions of law 
upon which the trial court's determination under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l was based. 
The facts presented through testimony and otherwise at trial do not have a direct affect, 
but are precursor only to that determination in the analysis requisite for such a challenge. 
This was particularly set forth in Hildreth's extensive analysis on the issue in his opening 
brief. Clearly the State has fallen susceptible to the confusion surrounding the 
marshaling requirement, as evidenced in its position in this matter. 
The first severance determination for a trial court under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-
1 is to decide whether the charges are unconnected in their commission. State v. Scales, 
as specifically cited by Hildreth in his opening brief in this matter, indicated that a 
determination under this prong of the "severance test" is very code-compliant dependent, 
requiring interpretation according to the plain language of the statute. Ibid., 946 P.2d 377 
(Utah App. 1997). Although it requires a look to the facts to determine if they were 
unconnected, Hildreth has challenged that, given the facts as found by the trial court or 
presented in the testimony and other evidence, it is obvious they are not. "[T]he grant or 
denial of severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, so we reverse [a 
denial] only if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges 'is a clear abuse of discretion in 
that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.'" State v. Lopez, 789 
3 
P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 1990), quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977). 
As cited in Hildreth's opening brief, where the question of severance presents a more 
difficult issue, this Court has "resolve[d] the issue in favor of assuring the defendant a 
fair trial." State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, 131, 198 P.3d 471. This "abuse of 
discretion" appellate standard of review respecting denials of severance alone indicates a 
challenge to the conclusions of law drawn by the trial court, with an emphasis on a 
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Conversely, a challenge to a factual finding requires review of the evidence and all 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the determination, 
reversing only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
under a reasonableness standard. State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 1 15, 63 P.3d 94; 
State v. Boss, 2005 UT App 520,19, 127 P.3d 1236. Clearly the standard of review for a 
challenge to factual findings, which implicates the marshaling requirement, is contrary to 
that for denial of a severance in that the former is determined in a light favorable to the 
determination while the latter is resolved in favor of the defendant. See, Balfour at ^31, 
supra. Additionally, a determination by this Court as to whether a trial court has 
adequately applied the facts to the law does not require a look to the sufficiency of the 
evidence itself, so clearly the standard of review affronted by the State in its brief is 
incorrect and marshaling is not required in this determination. 
Nonetheless, Hildreth has sufficiently marshaled the evidence in this matter albeit 
in line with prior marshaling requirements inclusive of "every scrap of evidence," but still 
meeting the new clarified standard of only "relevant supporting evidence." Kimball, 
4 
supra. Hildreth has included all evidence, not just that evidence pertaining to the 
opposition or supportive of the trial court's determination, since such detailing is 
necessary to meet the requirement of a challenge to the denial of the severance. All 
testimony, including that of Hildreth and his witnesses, was necessary to a determination 
as to (a) the connectedness of the charges, (b) whether a common scheme or plan existed 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8A-l(l)(B), and (c) whether Hildreth was thereby 
prejudiced by the denial of the severance. 
The State erroneously attempts to apply the marshaling requirement to challenges 
pertaining to the legal sufficiency of the evidence or conclusions of law, which would 
create a substantial burden on the defendant and be of no use to this Court in review of 
such matters. Requiring marshaling in challenges to severance issues would not "add[ ] 
discipline and order . . . precluding an unfocused allegation" that the conclusions are 
incorrect, and would not result in "requiring the appellate court to comb the record and 
see if that might possibly be true." Kimball supra. This Court is knowledgeable and 
well-positioned to determine whether a given set of facts have been applied correctly by 
the trial courts without the added distraction towards the factual findings when such 
challenge is not raised. 
II. INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF PRETRIAL MOTIONS ARE NOT 
FAVORED BY THIS COURT IN CRIMINAL MATTERS; 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW DO NOT DIFFER ON 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS VERSUS DIRECT APPEALS; AND 
DIRECT APPEALS FROM DENIALS OF SEVERANCE SUPPORTS 
PREJUDICE DETERMINATION THROUGH CONVICTION AT 
TRIAL. 
(A) Interlocutory Review Was Inappropriate in this Matter. 
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The State argues that Hildreth's challenge to the denial of the severance was more 
appropriately brought by request for interlocutory review under UT. R. APP. P. 5 prior to 
trial in this matter, citing Balfour at ^[31, supra, as support for their position. See, Brief of 
Appellee at pp. 26-27. The State is mistaken. While Balfour was brought on 
interlocutory review, its determination did not require such challenges to be raised in 
such manner and its citation to Balfour easily evidences this.1 
In 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §2337, it is well stated that, "[i]n a criminal 
prosecution, in the absence of a permissive statute, an appeal will not usually lie from an 
interlocutory order." It further states that, ". . .an appeal is not generally permitted from 
an order made before the final determination of a case, particularly . . .where the order 
affects a right that may still be vindicated after the trial." Id. Our Utah Supreme Court 
has indicated that it will not issue advisory opinions on interlocutory review ". . .by 
examining] a controversy that has not yet sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of 
legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 
371 (Utah 1995). 
Utah has a long history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single 
appeal from a single action. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, f^ 9, 
123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,1J68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v. 
New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Gara v. Findlav, 7 Utah 2d 218, 
1
 It is important to note that Balfour additionally raised challenges to the bindover and the denial of a motion to 
disqualify the prosecutions' office from his case, the merits of which were each entertained by this Court on 
interlocutory review. 
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321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958). Judge Orme stated the purpose of this position well in a 
concurring/dissenting opinion, as follows: 
When leave is not sought or when it is sought but denied, the question of 
whether the intermediate order was erroneous does not vaporize but is 
simply pushed forward for possible consideration after the entry of final 
judgment. Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one 
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek appeal of every 
immediate disposition along the way, as their right to fuss about such 
dispositions will be fully preserved for appeal following the entry of final 
judgment. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2007 UT App 382, Tf35 at fn. 1, 174 P.3d 1, 
Judge Orme concurring in part and dissenting in part; reversed on other grounds, 2009 
UT44,215P.3dl52. 
"Utah recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment in its notice of appeal, it is "not 
precluded from alleging errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or 
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were properly preserved." 
Zions First Naf 1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1997). "When an appellant files a notice of appeal from a final judgment, he may, in his 
opening brief, challenge all nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that 
final judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
At issue herein is UT. CODE ANN. §77-8a-l, which allows joinder of charges if it 
can be shown that they are "(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or 
7 
plan." Initially the trial court found that the Counts2 were "connected" as they occurred 
in Hildreth's home and professional offices during the course of what was purported to be 
medical care by Hildreth in his capacity as a chiropractor. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 15. Hence, 
the trial court concluded the Counts were properly joined and that Hildreth was not 
prejudiced thereby. Id. at pp. 15-16. However, the specific testimony and evidence had 
not yet been presented in its entirety for a complete understanding of whether such was 
the case, and would not be elicited through testimony and other evidence until the time of 
trial in this matter. Once all evidence was presented, it was clear to see that joinder of the 
Counts was inappropriate. Had Hildreth raised the issue by request for review of an 
interlocutory order, such evidence would not have been available for a thorough review 
of the question presented herein. 
(B) Standards of Review do not Differ with Interlocutory Versus Direct Appeals. 
The State argues that a different standard applies when a challenge to a denial of 
severance is raised in a direct appeal post-conviction rather than under Rule 5, claiming 
that proof of enor does not automatically result in reversal of the conviction. See, Brief 
of Appellee at pp. 27-28. "To decide whether trial court abused its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion to sever charges, Court of Appeals examines whether trial court 
complied with relevant Code provisions, interpreted according to common meaning of its 
plain language." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App 1997). On direct appeal of a 
denial of a motion for severance, this Court has indicated that "the grant or denial of 
Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are afforded the same meaning given them in Hildreth's Brief of 
Appellant. 
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severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, so we reverse [a denial] only 
if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges 'is a clear abuse of discretion in that it 
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.'" State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 
39, 42 (Utah App. 1990) quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977). On 
an interlocutory appeal taken from a denial of a motion for severance, the same standard 
was applied. See, Balfour at TflO, supra. 
Case law does not differentiate between a challenge to the denial of the severance 
brought by request for interlocutory review versus direct appeal from a conviction, and 
the State does not cite any support for such position. The denial challenged herein is 
based on a constitutional right to a fair trial under U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV and UT. 
CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. To differentiate a standard of review based on when an 
appeal is taken would necessarily result in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Operation of Laws Clause. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; UT. CONST. ART. I §24. 
(C) Direct Appeal Was Required to Evidence Prejudice. 
UT. CODE ANN. §77-8a-l(4)(a) states that separate trials of separate counts shall 
be ordered if the trial court finds a defendant is prejudiced by joinder. Doubts as to 
prejudice with respect to severance requests are to be resolved in favor of a defendant. 
State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 525 (Utah App. 1997), citing State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 
775, 777 (Utah 1980). In acknowledging the reluctance of trial courts to grant 
severances, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that such reluctance is "ill-advised and 
in the long run risks greater expenditure of judicial resources." Id, citing State v. 
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1986). 
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In denials of severance, an appellate court can "survey record to determine 
whether prejudicial error occurred during trial based on the ground of denial of motion to 
sever, even though, at time motion was originally made, trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying it." State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). The Utah 
Supreme Court noted that its review for "prejudicial error" upon affirmation of the denial 
of a motion for severance can be conducted on the same grounds as those supporting 
severance, with an eye towards the trial testimony itself to reveal whether such 
"prejudicial error" exists. Id. 
The grounds upon which the trial court initially determined the motion for 
severance in this matter were legally insufficient to deny such motion under UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-8a-l, as argued more particularly in Hildreth's opening brief in this matter. 
The trial court relied only upon the contentions that they each occurred in Hildreth's 
home and professional offices during the course of what was purported to be medical care 
by Hildreth in his capacity as a chiropractor. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 15. Such findings were 
insufficient for a denial of severance and Hildreth was forced to stand trial after such 
denial, which ultimately prejudiced him in the outcome—conviction. Regardless of 
whether the grounds are found to be legally sufficient at the time the motion was denied, 
Hildreth was ultimately prejudiced by such decision and this Court has the ability to 
reverse on that basis in support of protecting his right to a fair trial. See, Gaxiola and 
Telford, supra; U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
III. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS, HARMLESSNESS MUST 
BE FOUND TO BE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
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The State has argued that no prejudice resulted regardless of whether error 
occurred, affronting a "harmless" argument with respect to the challenge to the denial of 
the severance in this matter. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 31-35. However, the State has 
failed to show how the constitutional violation of Hildreth's right to a fair trial was 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," as is required for such finding on appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[a]mong other things, it is 
normally 'within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are 
carried out,' ... and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due 
Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 
U.S. 37, 41-44, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996), citing Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (citations 
omitted). The Court additionally held that, "[i]t is not the [government] which bears the 
burden of demonstrating that its rule is 'deeply rooted,' but rather [the defendant] who 
must show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by 
due process) is 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.'" Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-44, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 135 
L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). 
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"The primary guide in determining whether principle is fundamental, for due 
process purposes, is historical practice." United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (C.A.IO 
(N.M.) 1998). In State v. Saunders, this Court stated that it is "fundamental in our law 
that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, not for his general character. 
That principle is violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is 
justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts." 
Ibid., 1999 UT 59,H 15, 992 P.2d 951. "The rules against improper use of character 
evidence thus work 'to ensure that a defendant is only convicted because he committed 
the charged offense and not because the jury is convinced of his cumulative bad 
behavior.'" Id, citing State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118,11 24, 62 P.3d 444. This Court 
acknowledged that, "[t]he rule limiting the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes, as 
presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, has existed for almost a 
century in this state." Id.; see, e.g., State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490-94 (Utah 1997); 
State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d 219, 221, 418 P.2d 978, 979 (1966); State v. Winget 6 Utah 
2d 243, 244, 310 P.2d 738, 739 (1957); State v. Torgerson, 4 Utah 2d 52, 54, 286 P.2d 
800, 801 (1955); State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 133, 279 P.2d 914, 917 (1955); State v. 
Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 535-36, 201 P.2d 764, 767 (1949); State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 
20-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-23 (1947); State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 311-12, 148 P.2d 
327, 329 (1944); State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 277-81, 103 P. 250, 252 (1909). 
Concerning prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court has held the following: 
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings and the protections 
accorded those accused of crime under our law, including the presumption 
of innocence and the burden of the state to prove the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when there is a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was prejudicial that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. This is especially true where 
the error involved is one which transgresses against the exercise of a 
constitutional right. Consequently, the rule which we have numerous times 
stated is that if the error is such as to justify a belief that it had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, in that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have been a different 
result, then the error should not be regarded as harmless; and conversely, if 
the error is such that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
harmless in that the result would have been the same, then the error should 
not be deemed prejudicial and warrant granting a new trial. 
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).3 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has previously held that, if it ". . .finds violation of 
defendant's constitutional rights, conviction can stand only if Court of Appeals is 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that error was harmless." U.S. v. Bursoa 952 F.2d 
1196 (C.A.10 (N.M.) 1991), citim Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 
3
 In its analysis of the "reasonably likelihood" standard, the Utah Supreme Court determined: 
If we assume a spectrum of probabilities with zero percent at one end representing no likelihood 
of a different result and one hundred percent at the other end representing absolute certainty of 
a different result, we can array verbalizations of probabilities across that spectrum. A "mere 
possibility" is at the low end of the spectrum, "near certainty" is at the high end, and "more 
probable than not" is a likelihood greater than fifty percent. Of course, we cannot assign a 
definite spot on the spectrum to the term "reasonable likelihood," but we can give some 
guidance to the lower courts and counsel as to where a "reasonable likelihood" should fall. 
The erosion-of-confidence criterion gives substance to the more theoretical "reasonable 
likelihood" standard. It thus assists us in determining where on the spectrum of outcome 
probabilities discussed earlier "reasonable likelihood" might appear. For an error to require 
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence 
in the verdict. This is certainly above the "mere possibility" point on the spectrum. If it is "more 
probable than not" that the outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot 
possibly place confidence in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that 
confidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the "more 
probable than not" portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to define "reasonable 
likelihood" much more explicitly than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in 
deciding whether an error requires reversal. 
Id. at 919-920. 
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828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also, U.S. v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 485 (C.A.10 
(Colo.) 1993), United States v. Masses 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982). 
In the instant matter the State has charged that, even if Hildreth has proven error 
occurring in the denial of severance in this matter, such error was harmless since the jury 
adequately weighed the witnesses' testimonies individually and the evidence was 
sufficient as to counts upon which he was convicted absent the testimony of the others. If 
such is the case, then severance should have been supported by the State rather than 
sought by them at the trial court level in support of judicial economy and to ensure the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. However, it was not. 
The State now claims any error was harmless and that prejudice did not exist, but 
the State has failed to evidence how this standard of harmlessness can be met beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State's argument is cursory at best in its attempt to claim that 
prejudice has not been evidenced by Hildreth's articulate arguments. Given the case of 
Balfour alone, which is strikingly similar to the circumstances of Hildreth's case, it is 
clear that prejudice abounds when matters not rising to the same severity are combined 
with those matters that are susceptible to acquittal, as happened in this case. 
Rule 404(b) violations are fundamentally constitutional in nature, as are improper 
denials of severance leading to a violation of a defendant's right to a fair trial. See, 
Saunders, supra; UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l. Hence, the State was required to evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that such violations could be considered harmless in this 
matter, which is has failed to do. Regardless, such violations cannot stand in this matter 
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given the fundamental constitutional rights at issue. Hildreth should not be subjected to 
an improper conviction obtained through inadmissible evidence pertaining to his general 
character resultant of a violation of his right to a fair trial. 
"Rules that govern criminal proceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is a search 
for truth and that the verdict merits confidence." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987). Hence, "[i]t is entirely consistent with this aim to require that when error has 
eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial, we should start 
over and conduct a new trial." Id. 
IV. THE JURY'S RELIANCE ON THE TOTALITY OF THE 
TESTIMONY PRESENTED CULMINATED IN PREJUDICE. 
The State claims Hildreth is bound by the jury's determination that Weston was a 
more credible witness, as the jury rejected his version of events and accepted hers. See, 
Brief of Appellee at p. 23. The State further claims the jury accepted Weston's version of 
the facts leaving him to be bound by his credibility determinations. Id. at p. 25. The 
State also claims Hildreth cannot minimize or attack the remaining victims' testimony, 
even if he was acquitted of those Counts. Id. at pp. 25-26. The State asserts the jury 
presumptively accepted the other victims second guessed what happened to them when 
they learned of Weston's accusations against Hildreth; however, whatever their 
reasoning, the jury recognized Weston's accusations stood on a different footing. Id. at p. 
32. The State is mistaken in its position. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held the following: 
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It is the duty of this court to leave the question of credibility of witnesses to 
the jury or fact trier and we have quite consistently adhered to that policy. 
As has often been said, the jury is in a favored position to form impressions 
as to the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have the advantage of fairly 
close personal contact; the opportunity to observe appearance and general 
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of personalities. All of which 
they may consider in connection with the reactions, manner of expression, 
and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to and 
answering questions on both direct and cross-examination in determining 
whether, and to what extent, witnesses are to be believed. Whereas, the 
appellate court is handicapped by being limited to a review of an 
impersonal record. 
It is not a prerequisite to credibility that a witness be entirely accurate with 
respect to every detail of his testimony. If it were so, human frailties are 
such that it would be seldom that a witness who testified to any extent 
could be believed. The jury may evaluate the testimony of witnesses and 
accept those parts which they deem credible, even though there be some 
inconsistencies. An examination of the record here does not show that facts 
testified to would be impossible in the light of known physical facts, or so 
contradictory or uncertain as to justify a conclusion that any of the 
witnesses were entirely 'unworthy of belief as plaintiff contends. 
Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 395-396, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955) (footnotes 
omitted). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
As we have often said, credibility is an issue for the trier of fact, in this case 
the jury. See, e.g., James, 819 P.2d at 784; State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 
477 (Utah 1989); Booker, 709 P.2d at 345; State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 
(Utah 1977). The jury necessarily accepts the testimony of certain 
witnesses and discounts conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v. Western 
States Paving, Inc., 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979); Turner v. General 
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Moreover, 
as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury 
believed the evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 
610, 611 (Utah 1986,), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Stewart v. 
State by and through DeLand, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct.App.1992); State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1991); see Booker, 709 P.2d at 
345. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah,1993). 
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The State argues the victims, except for Weston, claimed Hildreth's actions 
against them were brief and momentary, while Weston testified Hildreth was aggressive, 
which the State contends Hildreth admitted. Brief of Appellee at p. 33. Hence, the State 
concludes it was unlikely the other victims' accusations against Hildreth would have 
roused the jury to overmastering hostility. Id. Furthermore, the State argues the other 
victims' testimony impeached Hildreath's claim he would never unduly expose a patient, 
that he was careful not to examine a patient alone, that he would explain what he was 
doing before he touched the patient, and that he would not grope a patient's breast. Id. at 
p. 34. Thus, the State argues all of the victims' testimony would be admissible at trial, 
even if severance had been granted. Id. 
The State, in part, agrees with Hildreth's position on appeal, that "[Beene's, 
Wagner's and Wihongi's] testimony still supports the jury's findings of guilt regarding 
Weston[.]" Brief of Appellee at pp. 25-26. Since Hildreth was convicted of the Counts 
involving Weston, this Court will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to those verdicts. Hamilton at 233-234. The jury was 
in a unique position of fairly close personal contact with Hildreth, Weston, and the 
remaining women. Gittens at 395-396. The jury was able to observe appearance and 
demeanor of the witnesses, which they could consider in connection with the reactions, 
manner of expression, and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to and 
answering questions during their testimony. Id. The jury's position in this matter, of 
hearing multiple accounts of inappropriate sexual conduct could only impact their 
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determination Hildreth was guilty of some kind of misconduct; hence, the jury returned 
their verdict concerning Weston. Had the jury not heard about multiple counts of 
inappropriate sexual conduct, it is probable they may have returned a different verdict 
with regards to Weston. 
Hildreth makes a credible argument in his Opening Brief that the jury was aroused 
into overmastering hostility against Hildreth. The only testimony refuting the victims' 
accounts in this matter was Hildreth's, which the jury discounted and instead relied on 
the Victims' testimony, leaving this Court to assume the jury believed the Victims 
testimony in order to support the verdict. Dunn at 1213. Therefore, the testimony of the 
other women, upon which it appears the jury relied in support of its verdict in its 
conviction on the counts involving Weston, prejudices Hildreth in its result and reversal 
is required. The trial court erred in denying the Motion to sever the charges as all the 
testimony from such Motion would not have been admissible nor should the Counts have 
been tried together. Thus, the failure to sever the counts and allow all the testimony to be 
presented in one trial in this matter has severely prejudiced Hildreth and reversal in this 
matter is required. 
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reverse 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Hildreth respectfully requests that this Court 
the denial of the Motion in this matter and take any such further action as this 
Court deems necessary. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2010. 
Aa&a'S. Bartholomi 
Carplyn E. Howard 
Attorneys for Grant Hildreth 
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